Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs

1991

Jerrold L. Davis v. Heath Development Company :
Brief of Respondent
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
J. Richard Bell; Bell & Bell; B.R. Parkinson; La Mar Duncan; Attorneys for Respondents.
C. Reed Brown; Armstrong, Rawlings, West & Schaerrer; Attorneys for Appellants.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Davis v. Heath Development Company, No. 914549.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1991).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/3836

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

U I MM
DC O V V r N I
KFU

u i n n -jurrctivit

UUUKI

EME COURT
BRIEF

45.9

F THE

DOCKET NO.

E CF UTA$

JERROLD L. DAVIS dba JERRY DAVIS AND
ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a corporation
dba PIONEER TRAILER PARK, SANDRA K.
FLINDERS, KATHRYN B. HSATH, DOROTHY A.
HOUSLEY, BONNIE J. BRINTOW, HELEN YOUNG,
MARY FRANCIS BENNION, LAWRENCE T. EEATH,
CAROLYN H. MARLER, NANCY H. FERRIN,

Case Mo. 145 49

Defendants-Appellants.
DOROTHY A. HOUSLEY and BONNIE J. BRINTON,

FILED

Cross-Complainants-Pespohdents,
vs.
HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a c o r p o r a t i o n ,
dba SICKER TOILER PARK,

Cross-De fendant-Appel1ant.

AUG 1 0 1976
Clerk, Suproma Courf, Utah

BRIEF OF CROSS-COMPLAINANTlS - RESPONDENTS
An Appeal from the Judgment of the Distinct Court of the Third
Judicial District, The Honorable q. Hal Taylor, Judqe
BELL & BELL
J, Richard Bell
303 East 2100 South
Salt LaKe City, Utah 94115
B, R. Parkinson
50 3 Phillips Petroleum Building
Sal-: LaXe City, at an 84101
Za Mar Duncan
70 6 Phillips Petroleum *3oilding
Salt LaXe City, Utah 34101
l » t t o r a ^ ; 3 £or

fcespor.&ei\ts

ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
WEST a SCHAERRER
C. Reed Brown
1300 Walker 3ank Building
SajLt Lake City, Utan 34ii:
Attorneys for Appellants

SUPREME COURT

OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JERROLD L. DAVIS dba JERRY DAVIS AND
ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a corporation
dba PIONEER TRAILER PARK, SANDRA H.
FLINDERS, KATHRYN B. HEATH, DOROTHY A.
HOUSLEY, BONNIE J. BRINTON, HELEN YOUNG,
MARY FRANCIS BENNION, LAWRENCE T. HEATH,
CAROLYN H. MARLER, NANCY H. FERRIN,

Case No. 14549

Defendants-Appellants.
DOROTHY A. HOUSLEY and BONNIE J. BRINTON,
Cross-Complainants-Respondents,
vs.
HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a corporation,
dba PIONEER TRAILER PARK,
Cross-Defendant-Appellant.
BRIEF OF CROSS-COMPLAINANTS - RESPONDENTS
An Appeal from the Judgment of the District Court of the Third
Judicial District, The Honorable G. Hal Taylor, Judge
BELL & BELL
J. Richard Bell
303 East 2100 South
Salt Lake City, Utah 84115
B. R. Parkinson
503 Phillips Petroleum Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
La Mar Duncan
706 Phillips Petroleum Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
Attorneys for Respondents

ARMSTRONG, RAWLINGS,
WEST & SCHAERRER
C. Reed Brown
1300 Walker Bank Building
Sait Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellants

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE

1

DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT

2

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL

2

STATEMENT OF FACTS

2

ARGUMENT

6

POINT I

POINT II

POINT III

POINT IV

POINT V

THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT OF
JANUARY 13, 1973, WAS SIGNED AND
ACCEPTED BY THE CORPORATION AND IS
ENFORCEABLE

6

THE TRANSACTIONS OF INTERESTED
DIRECTORS ARE NOT NECESSARILY VOID
OR VOIDABLE

9

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN
REFUSING TO ADMIT EXHIBITS D-9 AND
D-10

12

THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 16-10-74,
U.A.C. 195 3, AS AMENDED, WAS
COMPLIED WITH OR WAS NOT APPLICABLE.
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN
AWARDING INTEREST OF 6% PER ANNUM
ON PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S FEES
FROM APRIL 10, 1974, UNTIL ENTRY
OF JUDGMENT

CONCLUSION

. 15

18
18

CASES CITED
Branch vs. Western Factors, Inc., 28 Ut. 2d 361,
501 P. 2d 570 (1972)

9

Colorado Management Corporation vs. American
Founders Life Insurance Company, 359 P. 2d
665 (Colo. 1961)

8

Fountain vs. Orech's, Incorporated, 245 Minn. 202,
71 N.W. 2d 646 (1955)

8

TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
CASES CITED
Page
Grover vs. Garn, 23 Utah 2d 441, 464 P. 2d 598 (1970) .
Jeppi vs. Brockham Holding Co., 34 Cal. 2d (adv. 10),
206 P. 2d 847, ( ALR 2d 1297 (1949)
Mclntyre vs. Ajax Mining Co., 28 Ut. 171, 77 P. 613
(1904)
Pettingill vs. Perkins, 2 Ut. 2d 266, 272 P. 2d 185
(1954)

7, 1
16
16
10

Peterson vs. Holgren Land and Livestock Co., 12 Ut.
2d 125, 363 P. 2d 786 (1961)

7

Rocket Mining Corporation vs. Rulan J. Gill, 25 Ut.
2d 434, 483 P. 2d 897 (1971)

9

Runswick et al. vs. Floor et al., 116 Ut. 191, 208
P. 2d 948 (1949)

10,

St. Joe Paper Company vs. United States 155 Fed. 2d
93, Flor. (1964)
Swafford vs. Barry, 152 Colo. 493, 382 P. 2d 99 (1963).
Sweeney vs. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Ut. 2d 113, 417,
359 P. 2d 665 (1968)
U-beva Mines vs. Toledo Mining Co., 24 Ut. 2d 351,
471 P. 2d 867 (1970)

14
8
10,
16

OTHER AUTHORITIES CITED
7 ALR 2d, 784 (1949)
9 ALR 2d 1306 (1950)
58 ALR 2d, 784 (1958)
19 Am Jur 2d 720 §1311 (1965)

14
16
16
13

IN THE
SUPREME COURT
OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

JERROLD L. DAVIS dba JERRY DAVIS AND
ASSOCIATES,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.
HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a corporation
dba PIONEER TRAILER PARK, SANDRA H.
FLINDERS, KATHRYN B. HEATH, DOROTHY A.
HOUSLEY, BONNIE J. BRINTON, HELEN YOUNG,
MARY FRANCIS BENNION, LAWRENCE T. HEATH,
CAROLYN H. MARLER, NANCY H. FERRIN,

Case No. 14549

Defendants-Appellants.
DOROTHY A. HOUSLEY and BONNIE J. BRINTON,
Cross-Complainants-Respondents,
vs.
HEATH DEVELOPMENT COMPANY, a corporation,
dba PIONEER TRAILER PARK,
Cross-Defendant-Appellant.

CROSS-COMPLAINANTS-RESPONDENTS BRIEF ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action by Plaintiff real estate broker to
recover a real estate commission, and an action by CrossComplainants for specific performance of an Earnest Money
Agreement.

Each cause of action is against Heath Development

Company, a corporation.

The individual personal Defendants,
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all of whom were stockholders, were dismissed with prejudice
pursuant to stipulation at the time of the commencement of
the trial.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Trial was held before the Honorable G. Hal Taylor
sitting without a jury.

Judgment was entered against the

corporate Defendant for a real estate commission; and judgment
was entered requiring the corporate Defendant, Heath Development Company, to specifically perform the Earnest Money Agreement.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Appellants seek to have the judgment of the District
Court reversed, and the Respondents resist the same.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Defendant Heath Development Company is a Utah
corporation (hereinafter referred to as "corporation").

The

corporation's only asset at the time of the suit and for many
years prior thereto is a piece of real estate on which the
corporation (for many years) has operated a trailer park at
937 South State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah.

The corporation

is a close family corporation having ten stockholders.
officers and directors were stockholders.

All

The Articles of

Incorporation set the Board of Directors (hereinafter "Board")
at five, and there were four directors and one vacancy at
the time of the transaction.

There are outstanding ten shares
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of common stock of which more than 80% was held by the four
members of the Board each of whom owns at least two shares.
Of the remaining two shares, five stockholders own approximately two-tenths share each.

Over the past ten years the

corporation had tried to sell the trailer park, its only asset,
and in the absence of such a sale managed the trailer park
thereon.

During the ten year period, the corporation tried

to sell the trailer park on many occasions but never received
a written offer thereon with the exception of the Earnest
Money Agreement which is the subject matter of this Appeal.
Article X of the Articles of Incorporation provided in
the last sentence thereof that "the Board of Directors by
resolution shall have power to sell, mortgage or otherwise
dispose of the property of this corporation without the consent,
ratification or approval of the shareholders."

On November

13, 1973, the corporation entered into an exclusive listing
agreement with the Plaintiff.

That listing agreement was

signed by individual stockholders holding in excess of 90% of
the common stock, and in addition thereto Director Essie Heath,
deceased at the time of trial, signed on behalf of her two
children and a sister signed on behalf of a brother so that
the listing agreement purports to show 100% of the stockholders
signing the same.

The members of the family whose names were

subscribed to the listing agreement by their mother or sister
subsequently denied having given any authority to such family
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member.
The Cross-Complainants herein, Dorothy A. Housley and
Bonnie J. Brinton, (hereafter "Housley" and "Brinton") were
and are owners of over 40% of the common stock of the corporation, and are directors of the corporation.

On January 13,

1974, they, together with Elmer E. Brinton (not a party herein),
husband of Bonnie J. Brinton, did as purchasers through the
Plaintiff make an offer in an Earnest Money Agreement to the
corporation to purchase the trailer park for the sum of
$250,000.00.

A meeting was held at which all four directors

were in attendance and at which the Earnest Money Offer was
presented by Mr. Mason Rankin, agent for the Plaintiff. (T. 448)
The offer was valid for five days following the presentation,
and this was explained and known by the directors. (T. 468)
In fact the termsof the offer were gone over at least twice
(T. 448-450) and the meeting lasted for approximately two hours.
(T. 390)

The offer was accepted and signed by all four directors.

The informality so generally present in a close family corporation is reflected by the brief minutes of this meeting,
Exhibit "4", and reads in total as follows:
"June 13, 1974 Kayfs home. Report that property
on State Street priced too high - Offer of
$250,000.00 by Dorothy Housley, Bonnie and Elmer
Brinton $500.00 Earnest Money & using their stock
position as down payment. We each signed an
agreement to sell to Bonnie and Dorothy the property
of the Pioneer Trailer Court. May 1st subject to
financing." (Underscored portion is in the handwriting of Dorothy Housley)
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This minute entry was written by Essie Heath in her handwriting,
except the underscored portion, in a small minute book
(approximately 4"x7").

The purchase price is clearly set

forth; the down payment is designated, and it is specified
that the balance is to be paid on or before May 1st.

The

minutes also reflect a condition precedent, namely, the obtaining of financing which was timely obtained through First
Security Bank of Utah by way of a mortgage loan in the sum of
$187,000.00, more than sufficient to pay off the balance after
reducing the purchase price by the value of the stock held
by Housley and Brinton.

The value of the property and the

financial statements of Mr. and Mrs. Brinton and Housley were
not sufficient to obtain the loan notwithstanding that the
loan was a standard commercial loan reflecting 75% of the
market value of the property. (T.388)

Consequently, the bank

required a co-signer who was obtained.
Financing was completed on the 9th day of April, 1974,
and Plaintiff's agent, Rankin, immediately contacted Kathryn
B. Heath, president and director of the corporation, to obtain
her signature on the deed and arrange for a closing date on
the following day, April 10th.

Pursuant to an appointment

made with Mrs. Heath, agent Rankin appeared at her home at
which time she categorically refused to sign the deed or any
other papers and stated that she would never sign the necessary
papers or deed.
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The value of the common stock was determined in 1969
or 1970 following the death of Mrs. Housley1s mother.

This

determination was made by the Internal Revenue who set the
value at $18,000.00 per share for federal and state purposes.
(T. 471)

The Court at the time of trial found the common

stock, based on the $250,000.00 offer, to be approximately
$20,000.00 per share. (Finding of Fact #18)
At pages 5 and 6 of Appellant's Brief, the Appellant
sets forth two Earnest Money Agreements, Exhibits D-9 and D-10,
as though they were accepted facts and pertain to this case.
This is not only misleading but is in error.

The Court found

both of these offers to purchase from Mr. Hugh Wayman inadmissible on the grounds that they were immaterial.
and T. 521)

(T. 492

The Court's denial of admissibility is assigned

as an error in Point III of Appellant's Brief.
The Court found in favor of the Plaintiff and granted
a judgment against the Defendant corporation for $15,000.00
together with attorney's fees.

The Court further ordered

specific performance on the Cross-Claim of Housley and Brinton
ordering the corporation to convey the property to Housley
and Brinton and awarded attorney's fee in the sum of $7,000.00.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT OF JANUARY 13, 1973, WAS
SIGNED AND ACCEPTED BY THE CORPORATION AND IS ENFORCEABLE.
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A close corporation or a family corporation's stock
is held by relatively few stockholders, and the Board is
usually composed, as the case is here, completely of shareholders.

Judicially, a family corporation is allowed to

conduct its corporate business with informality, and the courts
do not require strict adherence to the corporate law and procedures as is found in the case of regular or public corporations.
There is a monolithic body of law applied to publicly
held corporations including complex security regulation systems
designed to protect investors.

Yet at the same time, courts

have recognized a difference between a publicly held corporation and the family close corporation, and an independent
body of law has grown up around the close corporation decreasing
the regulatory and strict construction of corporation law as
applied to close corporation.

Utah has recognized the family

or close corporation as is evidenced in Peterson vs. Holgren
Land and Livestock Co., 12 Ut. 2d 125, ^63 P. 2d 786 (1961),
where the Court stated:
"Even if the minutes of the Board of Directors
were insufficient to show expressed authorization, the facts that it was a family corporation in which the father was the president
and actively engaged in furthering its purposes,
and the articles of incorporation provided for
the acquirement and alienation of real property,
the finding of the court that the contract was
authorized should be sustained and the ground
that there was a binding ostensible authority
in its president." (Underscoring added)
Again, in Grover vs. Garn, 23 Ut. 2d 44^, 464 P. 2d 598 (1970) ,
-7-

this Court quoting from 19 C.J.S. Corporations §1004, at
page 471:
" . . . but the trend of authority is to uphold
as binding on the corporation acts or contracts
on its behalf by a person or persons owning all
or practically all of the stock." (Underscoring
added)
With regard to transactions involving interested directors in
closed corporations, the Minnesota Court in Fountain vs.
Orech's, Incorporated, 245 Minn. 202, 71 N.W. 2d 646 (1955)
held that an interested director could be included in determining whether a quorum was present or not, and there are
many other cases holding the same.

With regard to an interested

director voting on a matter, Colorado clearly permits the same
in a closed corporation:
"Where, as here, the stock of the corporation
is closely held at the time of the transaction,
there is no requirement as plaintiffs contend,
that an independent board of directors approve
such transaction." Swafford vs. Barry, 152 Colo*
493, 382 P. ?d 99x (1963)
The Colorado case, Colorado Management Corporation vs.
American Founder Life Insurance Co., 359 P. 2d 665, was decided
in 1961, two years before the Fountain case, and deals with
a public or regular corporation and not a closed corporation.
Likewise the cyclopedic authority relied on by the Appellant
is confined to the public corporations and not to closely
held corporations.

A reading of the cases fails to disclose

that any of those cases dealt with or urged the closely held
corporation theory as a basis for exception to the general
-8-

prevailing public corporation law.

In fact in the case of

Rocket Mining Corporation vs. Rolland J. Gill, 25 Ut. 2d,
483 P. 2d 897 (1971), the interested directors held no stock
whatsoever.

The public corporation law is intended to control

the activities of such director for he has nothing to lose.
The real test in a closely held corporation as is set forth
in Swafford vs. Barry is that the transaction must be accompanied
by a full and fair disclosure of the material facts and must
not be attended with unfairness and fraud.

The material

facts of this transaction were disclosed.

The corporation

claimed fraud but the Lower Court did n0t find evidence of
fraud and none is alleged on appeal.

The Court did find that

the purchasers, at the time of making tjie offer, did believe
that $250,000.00 was the reasonable and fair market value for
the trailer court and were unaware of and had no knowledge of
any offer by a third party. (Finding of Fact #15)
The Earnest Money Agreement is valid and enforceable.
POINT II
THE TRANSACTIONS OF INTERESTED DIRECTORS ARE NOT
NECESSARILY VOID OR VOIDABLE.
The Appellant's Brief acknowledges this rule of law by
quoting from Branch vs. Western Factors, Inc., 2 8 Ut. 2d 361,
502 P. 2d 570 (1972) that a contract made by a corporation
with its officers is not void per se ". . . but at most voidable within a reasonable time."

The Branch case also states
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that "a director occupies a fiduciary relationship to his
corporation and his personal dealings with the corporation
may be voided unless good faith and fairness are shown.

The

requirement of good faith is one of long standing with this
Court.

Sweeney vs. Happy Valley, Inc., 18 Ut. 2d 113, 417 P.

2d. 126 (1968), Mclntyre vs. Ajax Mining Co., 28 Ut. 171, 77
P. 613 (1904), Runswick et al vs. Floor et al, 116 Ut. 191,
208 P. 2d 948 (1949).

Appellantfs Brief does not really

attack the "good faith" issue, and Finding of Fact #15 shows
good faith on behalf of Housley and Brinton.
As pertains to the "fairness" issue, the duty and burden
of proof is upon the director to show fciirness only after the
corporation has raised the question of fairness in its pleadings so that the issues and points therein may be fairly met.
The Defendant did not raise the question of "fairness" below,
but only in the sense of Housley and Brinton taking advantage
of corporate opportunity.

The corporation now seeks to raise

for the first time another and different item of fairness,
namely, that the $250,000.00 purchase price is unfair.

This

Court has many times pointed out the f ruitlessness of an attempt
to shift theory and position on appeal.
" . . . Having by his own pleadings, evidence, and
instructions tried and rested the case upon the
theory that the mother's negligence would bar
the father, he is bound thereby, as the law of the
case. He cannot now on appeal shift his theory
and position." Pettingill vs. Perkins, 2 Ut. 2d
266, 272 P. 2d 185 (1954) and cases cited therein.
-10-

Assuming for the sake of analysis that the question
of "fairness" had been properly raised at trial, the evidence
showed the transaction to be fair.

In quch cases this Court

has often looked to the facts in a particular case.

Here,

for over ten years this corporation wanted to sell the trailer
court and distribute the proceeds; the directors were aware
of a zoning problem with regard to the property; (T. 436) the
terms of the sale were cash permitting the distributing of
the money and ending of the corporation, a desired end; (T. 469)
by signing the agreement 80% of the stockholders acknowledged
the contract was fair and ratified it; a prior tax valuation
in 1969 or 1970 set the common stock at the value of $18,000.00
per share; (T. 471) the $250,000.00 purchase price, after
expenses and payment off of the preferred 2,500 shares of stock,
par value of $10.00 per share, would have resulted in cash
distribution of approximately $20,000.00 per share of common
stock; (Finding of Fact #18) the corporation had never had
a written offer notwithstanding its long efforts to sell the
property; Housley and Brinton would not have shared in the
cash; and the loan arranged for in the amount of $187,000.00
was a standard commercial loan and represented 75% of the
value of the property and even then there was a requirement
by the bank of a co-signer.

It is clear that even though the

Defendant corporation failed to raise the purchase price as
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being an item of claimed unfairness, an examination of the
facts reveal that the purchase price was indeed fair.
The Defendant relies on the Runswick case and quotes
therefrom, and then goes on to attack the validity of a quorum
of the board.

This issue has already been met in Point I.
POINT III

THE DISTRICT COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING TO ADMIT
EXHIBITS D-9 AND D-10.
Testimony relating to Exhibit D-9, an Earnest Money
Agreement dated March 15, 1974, by and between the two interested directors as sellers and Hugh Wayman, an outsider, as
purchaser, was found inadmissible because it was improper
cross-examination.(T. 374)

Appellant's Brief fails to attack

this Court ruling.
The Defendant then again offered Exhibit D-9 for a
particular purpose as stated by its attorney:
11

1 claim, Your Honor, this is taking
advantage of a corporation opportunity."
(T. 492-3)
The Court correctly ruled Exhibit D-9 as being immaterial as
there was no evidence of Housley and Brinton taking advantage
of any corporate opportunity.

That evidence did not exist

at the time the exhibit was offered nor did it come about
thereafter as is reflected in the Court's Finding of Fact #5
which is not attacked by the Defendant.
Corporate opportunity is defined in 19 Am Jur 2d 720,
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Corporations §1311/ as follows:
"A corporate officer or director is under a
fiduciary obligation not to divert a corporate business opportunity for his own
personal gain. The rule as supported by a
number of cases is that if there is presented
to a corporate officer or director a business
opportunity which the corporation is financially
able to undertake, which is, from its nature,
in line of the corporation's business and is
a practical advantage to it, and which is one
in which the corporation has an interest or
reasonable expectancy, and if, by embracing
the opportunity, the self-interest of the
officer or director will be brought into conflict with that of the corporation, the law
will not permit him to seize the opportunity
for himself. If he does the corporation may
claim the benefit of the transaction. . . The
doctrine charges the interest acquired by an
officer or director of a corporation in violation of his duty with a trust for the benefit
of the corporation."
Housley and Brinton at the time of making their offer to the
corporation believed that the $250,000.00 offer was a reasonable
and fair market value for the trailer court and were unaware
of and had no

knowledge of any offer by a third party or

parties to purchase the trailer park for a sum in excess of
the offer which they made.

Further, Exhibit D-9 was never

offered to show market value or unfairness of the purchase price,
but only to pursue the corporation's claim of corporate opportunity.

Appellant failed to show the existence of any outstanding

corporate opportunity at the time the transaction was entered
into with Housley and Brinton.
Exhibit D-10 is an Earnest Money Offer which was never
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accepted by the corporation, and dated April 11, 1974, from
a third party to the corporation.

In pursuing the corporation's

theory of Housley and Brinton taking advantage of corporate
opportunity, the exhibit was offered to show the market value
of the trailer court.

Since the offer was never accepted, the

Court correctly excluded it.
"The pronounced tendency of most of the courts
which have dealt with the matter has been to
rule against the admissibility upon the issue
of the market value of the real property as
evidence as to mere unaccepted offers to purchase."
(Annotation 7 ALR 2d 784, §2 entitled Unaccepted
Offer for Purchase or Sale of Real Property as
Evidence of Value)
The Sweeney case cited by the corporation is not
applicable since it deals with an actual sale rather than an
offer to purchase.

In the St. Joe Paper Company vs. United

States, 155 Fed. 2d 93, Flor. (1964) the Court examined the
reason behind the general rule of not allowing offers to establish market value and stated:
" . . . the amount for which an owner could have
sold his property or which a prospective purchaser might have been willing to pay'is influenced
by too many fortuitous circumstances to be revelant
on the inquiry of value to be admissible as substantive proof thereof by the owner in a condemnation proceeding.1"
Further, Exhibit D-10 is inadmissible under the heresay
rule as the offer was tendered in order to show the truth of
the matter stated therein, namely, valuation of the property.
The offeror was not a party to this lawsuit, nor was he a
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witness; nor was it shown that he had an expertise as to
valuation of property.
Exhibits D-9 and D-10 were properly excluded.

Interest-

ingly enough the remedy, as noted above, available for taking
advantage of corporate opportunity results in a trust of the
benefits or advantages for the corporation.

The Appellant

has never sought the remedy, but uses the doctrine of corporate opportunity as a basis for the corporation's refusal to
complete the sale of the trailer park.
POINT IV
THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 16-10-74, U.A.C. 1953, AS
AMENDED, WAS COMPLIED WITH OR WAS NOT APPLICABLE.
This statute is limited to the sale of all of the
property and assets of the corporation, if not made in the
"usual and regular course of its business."

The sale in this

case was made in the usual course of the corporation's business.
The facts of this case reveal that for at least ten years the
corporation had two purposes or objects.

One was to sell the

trailer park and to liquidate and distribute the monies resulting
therefrom.

The second object was to manage the trailer park

for such period of time as it may be necessary to obtain the
sale and distribution.

The corporation for at least ten years

had so acted with this duel purpose in mind. (Finding of Fact #4)
Thus, the Appellant corporation was not unlike the corporation
which is created for the purpose of managing and disposing of
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a particular estate or property.

In Jeppi vs. Brockman Holding

Co., 34 Cal. 2d (Adv. 10), 206 P. 2d 847, 9 ALR 2d 1297 (1949) it
involved a corporation which was formed for such purpose and
construed a similar statute as not prohibiting the sale even
of all its corporate property if in fact such sale achieves
its goals and purposes. (See Annotation 9 ALR 2d 1306, Sale
of Corporate Assets.)
There is a split of authority as to who may assert the
invalidity of a sale based upon a statute of this kind.

The

various holdings are discussed in Annotation 58 ALR 2d 784,
Disposal of Property.

It seems clear that this type of statute

was enacted for the protection of the shareholders, and the
general rule is that shareholders alone have the right to enforce
the statute's requirements.

At Page 793 of the Annotation

it is stated:
"A statute of this type under consideration
being for the sole benefit of the shareholders,
is ordinarily held that the corporation itself
has no standing to allege the invalidity of the
transfer of its property executed without the
consent required by statute of its stockholders. . ."
Our own statute must be read in light of the following section,
namely, 16-10-75, which confers upon the "shareholder" the
right to dissent and take appropriate action.

This Court in

Ubeva Mines vs. Toledo Mining Co., 24 Ut. 2d 351, 471 P. 2d
867 (1970), has held that Section 74 inures to the benefit of
the shareholders and must be asserted by them.
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Failure of the shareholders to assert this statute
within one year impliedly waives their rights.

Further, all

ten stockholders were parties Defendant to this lawsuit as
originally filed and none of them raised the statute or the
benefits thereunder as a defense.

In fact all of them agreed

to be dismissed out of the lawsuit with prejudice, and thereby
again waived their rights under the statute.

In addition,

the shareholders waived their right under the statute by virtue
of Article X of the corporation's Articles of Incorporation
which state that: "The Board of Directors by resolution have
power to sell. . . the property of this corporation without
consent, ratification or approval of the stockholders."
The Grover case appears to be controlling in this case.
It follows the line of reasoning that where the owners of
substantially all of the shares of authprized stock enter
into a contract, the contract becomes binding upon the corporation even though the formal requirements of the statute
have not been met.

The Grover case involved a family corporation

with the husband and wife owning 90% of the shares and being
directors of the corporation.

They entered into a contract

on behalf of the corporation for the sale of real property
and the primary asset of the corporation.

The contract was

never formally ratified by the remaining stockholders.

This

Court held that the failure to obtain th£ shareholders' formal
ratification did not destroy the contract.
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Further, this

Court recognized that:
" . . . trend of authority is to uphold as
binding upon the corporation acts or contracts
on its behalf by a person or persons owning all
or practically all of the stock." (Utah
Citation, Page 446)
The corporation's attempt to distinguish Grover by claiming
that the holding was based upon a finding that the corporation
in that case was a sham

corporation.

Such is not the case.

This Court actually reversed the Trial Court's ruling of
personal liability of the shareholders of the corporate contract, and recognized the validity of the corporation.
Section 16-10-74 of our Code is not a bar to this
transaction.
POINT V
DID THE DISTRICT COURT ERR IN AWARDING INTEREST OF 6%
PER ANNUM ON PLAINTIFF'S ATTORNEY'S FEES FROM APRIL 10, 1974,
UNTIL ENTRY OF JUDGMENT?
This issue does not affect the position of the CrossComplainants - Respondents Housley and Brinton and therefore
no position is taken.
CONCLUSION
It is respectfully requested that this Court uphold
the judgment of the Trial Court as pertains to the Respondents
Housley and Brinton, and that the Defendant corporation
specifically perform the agreement.
Respectfully submitted,
BHMD & .BELL

1

^.IRichard Bell
/303 East 2100 South
v
Saftt Lake City, Utah 84115
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Attorneys for Respondents
Housley and Brinton

